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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is one of 
the few concrete institutional legacies of former Secretary General 
Kofi Annan’s ambitious agenda for reforming the world body.  The 
PBC came formally into existence in June 2006, six months after 
identical resolutions authorizing its creation were passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Security Council.1
The PBC was conceived to fill a perceived gap in the United Na-
tions’s institutional fabric.  In the words of Annan’s 2005 manifesto 
for U.N. reform, In Larger Freedom, “there is a gaping hole in the 
United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Na-
tions system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries 
with the transition from war to lasting peace.”2  The logic behind the 
PBC’s creation, first formally proposed in December 2004 in the re-
port of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges, and Change, was as follows: the Security Council is charged 
with maintaining peace and security; the Economic and Social Coun-
cil is responsible for long-term development issues; but no dedicated 
intergovernmental machinery exists for addressing the needs of 
countries that have emerged from a period of war—particularly civil 
war, during which governmental authority evaporates—but have not 
yet achieved the degree of state consolidation required to pursue a 
 ∗ Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, and Fellow, Ralph Bunche Insti-
tute for International Studies, The Graduate Center, City University of New York. 
 1 S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 
1654]; G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
 2 The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Hu-
man Rights for All—Reports from the Secretary-General, ¶ 114, delivered to the General Assem-
bly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
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systematic development agenda.3  They are still “fragile” states, not 
yet even regular “developing” or even “least developed” countries. 
What the United Nations needed, according to the September 
2005 U.N. Summit Outcome Document, through which heads of state 
and government endorsed the proposal to create a Peacebuilding 
Commission, was a new body that could exercise oversight over the 
slow and uneven process by which—if circumstances permit—
systemic violence and fragmented authority structures give way to civil 
politics and state consolidation.4  A new intergovernmental institu-
tion was required to (1) coordinate the efforts of international actors, 
within and beyond the U.N. system, working to rebuild failed states; 
(2) sustain global public attention to “post-conflict” countries that 
threaten to slip down (or off) the international community’s radar; 
and (3) marshal additional external resources for post-conflict coun-
tries so that financial flows (the lifeblood of nascent states) are made 
more predictable.5
Whether this was, in fact, a logical conclusion for the interna-
tional community collectively to have reached—especially when con-
sidered alongside the organizational pathologies that have long 
plagued the U.N. system6—is debatable.  Arguably, the United Na-
tions has faced severe difficulties rebuilding failed states, not for the 
lack of an intergovernmental body devoted to a particular phase in 
the continuum between war and peace, but because of larger, more 
systemic problems, which an intergovernmental body possessing no 
executive authority stands little chance of rectifying.7
Among the most visible of these challenges is the proliferation of 
U.N. entities engaged in various aspects of post-conflict peacebuild-
ing, such as reforming security agencies, monitoring elections, estab-
lishing institutions to hold war criminals to account, rebuilding the 
economic infrastructure, promoting inter-communal tolerance, en-
hancing the capacity of civil society advocates to lobby for democratic 
 3 U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.un.org/secureworld/ 
report.pdf. 
 4 See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 97–105, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 5 S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, Preamble. 
 6 See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 34–41 (2004). 
 7 The primacy of politics, rather than bureaucratic efficiency, is emphasized in 
such studies as SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, 
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND STATE-BUILDING (2004). 
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development, and so forth.8  But without direct or indirect control 
over a critical mass of the humanitarian and development agencies 
concerned, a new commission, working with little more than a man-
date to “coordinate” the efforts of U.N. and other actors working in 
post-conflict countries, would seem to be of dubious value.9
The somewhat vague and meandering resolution that created 
the PBC duly emphasizes the other reasons a new body was seen to be 
needed: the lack of sustained international attention to post-conflict 
countries once an accord is signed or peacekeepers begin departing; 
the absence of predictable flows of external finance for post-conflict 
governments; and onerous procedures for reporting to the huge  
array of donor agencies—multilateral, bilateral, and non-
governmental—from which aid is received.10 But coordination—
developing common approaches among external actors and institut-
ing rational divisions of labor among all actors, both domestic and in-
ternational—is in a sense the PBC’s core objective, which if realized 
would, in theory, enable others fulfillment of the others.11
As a mechanism for coordinating the international community’s 
efforts to rebuild failed states, the PBC can point to few tangible suc-
cesses of its own making.  Sierra Leone’s successful elections of 2007, 
in which power changed hands with a minimum of violence, had lit-
 8 The gradual expansion of the various dimensions of peacebuilding is docu-
mented in HO-WON JEONG, PEACEBUILDING IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES: STRATEGY AND 
PROCESS (2005), as well as in policy-analysis documents such as Shepard Forman, 
Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable Peace (2004), available 
at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/conflict/Forman-%20Building%20Civilian%20 
Capacity.pdf. 
 9 This was a prominent view in the extensive consultations on institutional de-
sign that preceded the PBC’s establishment—among member-states, nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs), U.N. officials, and policy academics.  See, e.g., CTR. ON 
INT’L COOPERATION, CONSULTATION REPORT: POST CONFLICT TRANSITIONS, NATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2005); INT’L PEACE RES. INST., TOWARDS A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING: GETTING THEIR ACT TOGETHER: OVERVIEW REPORT OF 
THE JOINT UTSTEIN STUDY OF PEACEBUILDING (2004). 
 10 See generally S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1.  These general preoccupations are 
outlined in the preamble to Resolution 1654, but are made specific “purposes” of the 
PBC in the various sections of paragraph two.  The financial aspects of peacebuilding 
receive special mention in a number of places, including paragraph twenty-four, 
which calls for the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and paragraphs that 
mention the need for coordination with the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs).  Id. ¶¶ 7(e), 9, 14. 
 11 Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk, Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Post-
War State-Building, in THE DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF POSTWAR PEACE OPERATIONS (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the 
international community’s preoccupation with coordination—and the tendency of 
this obsession to obscure more fundamental problems).  
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tle to do with the PBC.  By the same token, had things turned out 
badly, the PBC could not reasonably have taken the blame. 
Whether the PBC has made substantial contributions to state-
rebuilding in the countries in which it has worked is a matter of in-
terpretation.  The verdict depends critically on which benchmarks 
are considered reasonable.12  Regardless of which standards one ap-
plies, however, PBC-defenders are liable to reply that the PBC must 
be cut greater slack.  As a new institution, it was forced to incur the 
inevitable (one-off) start-up costs of devising organizational struc-
tures, agreeing on working methods, and finding suitable channels 
for relating with other parts of the United Nations, notably the Secu-
rity Council.  Moreover, the acrimony that attended the prior debate 
concerning whether a PBC should be created—and if so, of what 
type—meant that the PBC went through a traumatic pregnancy and 
difficult birth, from which it is still convalescing.13
One way in which the PBC is supposed to enhance coordination 
in the rebuilding of post-conflict states is by devising “integrated 
peacebuilding strategies” (IPBSs).  These are mentioned in the PBC’s 
founding resolutions generically, as among the PBC’s responsibilities, 
but with no definition of what they should include, what purposes 
they should serve, and how they should be operationalized.14  
Handed a blank slate, the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) 
took the lead in developing these IPBSs as “compacts”—emulating 
the terminology of the post-conflict, aid-coordination agreement 
used in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s demise in late 2001.  
Compacts of this type specify a range of goals and actions that devel-
opment agencies and government authorities will pursue.  The word 
compact struck some (mainly developing country) PBC members as 
too legalistic for what Resolution 1645 calls merely a “strategy.”  The 
term “framework” was ultimately agreed upon, although these IPBS 
(or Framework) documents structurally adopt much of the form of a 
compact, indicating commitments on the part of donors, government 
authorities, and the PBC itself.  By the end of 2007, the PBC had de-
veloped “Peacebuilding Frameworks” for Burundi and Sierra Leone, 
 12 A group of NGOs that produced a first-year report card on the PBC in June 
2007 found that, procedurally, the PBC had made great progress—especially in terms 
of consulting civil society—but that the PBC did less well when it came to appreciat-
ing the “political” aspects of peacebuilding in Burundi and Sierra Leone.  See ACTION 
AID, CAFOD & CARE INTERNATIONAL, CONSOLIDATING THE PEACE?  VIEWS FROM SIERRA 
LEONE AND BURUNDI ON THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION (2007). 
 13 Interview with a consultant to one of Kofi Annan’s key advisers during 2005, in 
New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2007). 
 14 S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 2. 
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the first two countries on its agenda.  Each national Framework os-
tensibly represents a common approach to rebuilding state authority 
that all actors—national and international—have agreed jointly to 
pursue.  In theory, a shared vision, complemented by an agreed divi-
sion of labor, should mitigate the debilitating fragmentation of the 
international community’s work in post-conflict environments. 
Substantively, the PBC-brokered Frameworks for Burundi and 
Sierra Leone are mainly collages of existing national strategy docu-
ments.  They, for the most part, reaffirm the importance of policy 
measures and institutional reforms that had already, in one form or 
another, been agreed to between each of the governments and its re-
spective consortium of donors.  The Framework documents for Bu-
rundi and Sierra Leone do assign general responsibilities to govern-
ment actors, external donors, and indeed the PBC.15  But in the end, 
the PBC has no authority to insist that independent donor agencies—
the bilateral aid programs of leading member-states as well as plan-
ning and operational staff of multilateral agencies—restructure their 
country strategies if these appear to duplicate (or in some other way 
undermine) the work of peacebuilding actors, domestic or external. 
Moreover, there are scant grounds for believing that the “moni-
toring and tracking” mechanisms devised for each of the two coun-
tries’ Peacebuilding Frameworks will influence the behavior of gov-
ernment authorities or donor agencies that may find it convenient to 
stray from agreed commitments.16  This is only partly because the 
Frameworks lack viable enforcement mechanisms.  As important is 
the difficulty of identifying agreed benchmarks for measuring pro-
gress in the typical “priority areas” identified: youth employment, 
governance reform, capacity-building, and so forth. 
 15 U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, 
U.N. Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4 (June 22, 2007); U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Sierra Leone 
Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1 (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 16 For Sierra Leone, issues of “Review and Tracking Progress” are treated in Si-
erra Leone’s Framework document itself.  U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Sierra Leone 
Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, ¶¶ 30–35, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1 (Dec. 3, 
2007).  “Monitoring and tracking” for Burundi’s Framework are dealt with in a sepa-
rate document.  See U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism 
of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/BDI/4 (Nov. 
27, 2007).  The intergovernmental discussions that preceded the adoption of the 
“Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism” for Burundi revealed the discomfort of many 
states with the vague—and seemingly unenforceable—provisions for systematic fol-
low-up action.  See U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Burundi Configuration, Chairman’s 
Summary: Informal Meeting on Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Frame-
work for Peacebuilding in Burundi, (Oct. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Country-Specific%20Configurations/ 
Burundi/Chair%20summary_18Oct07.pdf. 
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There is, in short, little evidence that the PBC has promoted 
substantive coordination among the donors and other external actors 
operating in the first two countries placed on its agenda.  This has 
prevented the achievement of the PBC’s other main objectives, all of 
which rely, in one respect or another, on enhanced coordination.  
There are various reasons for this, most of which, I have argued else-
where, stem from the PBC’s organizational design, which all but en-
sures a North-South deadlock on many crucial issues.17
On the other hand, the PBC has had a number of small suc-
cesses that could, on a more expansive reading of the term, be con-
sidered examples of improved coordination.  They are extremely var-
ied—everything from strengthening links between the PBC and the 
Security Council, to participation in interagency processes by the 
PBSO, whose creation was specified in the PBC’s founding resolu-
tion.18  These minor triumphs are usually of limited short-term con-
sequence.  But they at least stand a chance of adding up over time. 
This essay examines a sample of these institutional developments 
to provide a fuller account of what actions the PBC—and crucially, as 
we shall see, each of its component parts—has been taking, and why 
the pattern that is emerging may be significant.  The examples dis-
cussed demonstrate how successful the PBC has been when measured 
against a quite different yardstick, that of institutional survival in a 
very densely populated organizational habitat: the community of in-
ternational post-conflict reconstruction and state-building agencies 
centered in the United Nations, which is itself undergoing near-
constant change.19  New institutional structures either adapt to their 
ecological context or wither, remaining in form even if empty of sub-
stance.  The PBC, whatever else may be said of its operation to date, is 
not empty of substance.  It has adapted and survived its institutional 
 17 See Rob Jenkins, The U.N. Peacebuilding Commission and the Dissemination of Inter-
national Norms, (London Sch. Econ. Crisis States Res. Ctr., Working Paper 39, 2008), 
available at http://www.crisisstates.com/publications/phase2papers.htm. 
 18 S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 23. 
 19 That arrangements for post-conflict planning and operations have been in a 
state of organizational flux for a considerable period can be seen from U.N. reforms 
instituted in 1997 to give the “lead peacebuilding role” to the United Nations’s De-
partment of Political Affairs, which was expected to oversee country-level “Peace 
Building Support Offices” (PBSOs).  The role of these country-level PBSOs was to 
encompass, among other things, “confidence-building and political stabilization ef-
forts, electoral support, [and] efforts to strengthen and legitimate a new government 
established through political support.”  See James Busumtwi-Sam, Alexander Costy & 
Bruce D. Jones, Structural Deficits and Institutional Adaptations to Conflict and Peacebuild-
ing in Africa, in DURABLE PEACE: CHALLENGES FOR PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA 354, 378 
(Taiser M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews eds., 2004). 
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infancy, and its emerging shape is largely a reflection of the political 
and organizational context into which it has been born.  It is an actor 
with which other institutional stakeholders must contend.  This is no 
mean feat.  The PBC has taken its place in a crowded field as much 
through improvisation on the part of key actors associated with this 
complex organ as it has through the rational development of clear 
operational guidelines. 
This essay makes the case that observing and analyzing the proc-
ess by which the PBC attempts to strike roots—that is, to occupy an 
institutional niche by creatively interpreting an imprecise and malle-
able mandate—is revealing about the micro-dynamof U.N. reforms. 
Member-states, U.N. agencies, Secretariat departments, insider non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), various U.N. Councils and 
Commissions—each seeks to steer the new structures to its own pur-
poses, or to ensure that, at a minimum, any newly created body does 
not stray onto its turf.  This is a recipe for institutional gridlock.  But 
possibilities exist for the organizationally entrepreneurial.   
Finally, it will be argued that a significant factor in explaining 
the PBC’s ability successfully to begin occupying an organizational 
niche within the U.N. system—and within the post-conflict state-
reconstruction community more generally20—is the set of incentives 
facing key actors within the PBC.  PBC actors are strongly motivated 
to focus on their own “sub-institutional” component of the PBC.  The 
PBC has, in effect, disaggregated itself into these component parts 
(or sub-institutions) to maximize its chances of survival. 
The three main components of the PBC were outlined in Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1645: the intergovernmental PBC itself, the 
bureaucratic PBSO, and a standing Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), con-
sisting of voluntary contributions.  Though originally thought of and 
referred to collectively as the PBC, they are now more commonly re-
garded as elements comprising the United Nations’s new “peace-
building architecture,” with the moniker “Peacebuilding Commis-
sion” correctly reserved for the intergovernmental component.  This 
shift in terminology is significant, representing an attempt on the 
part of both the PBSO and the PBF to assert their own relative 
autonomy from the PBC.  The adaptive strategies deployed by both 
the intergovernmental Commission itself—including its member-
states, with all their conflicting perceptions and interests—and the 
 20 Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, 22 INT’L 
SECURITY 54, 54–89 (1997). 
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bureaucratic PBSO are analyzed in more detail than is the PBF, which 
for reasons of space receives only cursory treatment.21
The remainder of the essay will proceed as follows: Part II briefly 
outlines the PBC’s basic structure and mandate and makes the case 
for seeing the PBC’s adaptive success as a product of the individual 
strategies of its three main components.  Part III examines the inter-
governmental face of the PBC.  The bureaucratic PBSO is analyzed in 
Part IV.  Part V concludes with a summary of the argument, an over-
view of how the PBF—the third of the UN peacebuilding architec-
ture’s three components—is identifying and beginning to occupy its 
own institutional niche, and an assessment of the forces most likely to 
impinge on the PBC’s future institutional trajectory. 
II. THE PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE:  
THE PBC’S MISSION AND STRUCTURE 
Before proceeding to an analysis of key events that took place 
during the PBC’s first two years in existence, a brief description of the 
structure, procedures, and formal mandate of the PBC is in order. 
The PBC’s mission is to assist states “emerging from conflict” to 
avoid lapsing back into violence—an all too familiar occurrence.22  As 
an intergovernmental body composed of thirty-one member-states, 
the PBC’s core mission is to galvanize the international community 
around the challenge of rebuilding collapsed states and, in particu-
lar, to translate this interest into concrete commitments of long-term 
financing, of transformed donor practices, and of coordination 
among the U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, and non-governmental 
organizations contributing to these peace- and state-building efforts. 
While, strictly speaking, the PBC itself is an intergovernmental 
body, the term “Peacebuilding Commission” is commonly (if incor-
rectly) used to refer to the triad of institutional pillars on which the 
United Nations’s new “peacebuilding architecture” rests.  The three 
pillars are outlined in Resolution 1645, passed simultaneously and 
identically by the Security Council and the General Assembly in De-
cember 2005, little more than three months after the World Summit 
endorsed the PBC’s creation.23  The three pillars are: 
 21 The PBF will be discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming book-length analy-
sis of the PBC.  See ROB JENKINS, PEACEBUILDING: FROM CONCEPT TO COMMISSION 
(forthcoming 2009). 
 22 HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN THE 
21ST  CENTURY (2005). 
 23 See generally S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1. 
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1. The thirty-one-member-state PBC itself, which convenes 
in two forms: 
a. as the Organizational Committee (just the thirty-
one members), which decides on the structures 
and procedures through which the commission is 
to undertake its work; and 
b. in Country-Specific Configurations (CSCs), 
wherein the PBC engages with particular post-
conflict countries on its agenda, and which in-
cludes, in addition to the thirty-one core mem-
bers, the following: a selection of member-states 
selected on the basis of proximity to the post-
conflict state in question or recent experience 
recovering from conflict; relevant U.N. agencies, 
secretariat departments, and senior field manag-
ers; regional and sub-regional bodies (the Afri-
can and European Unions, for instance); and the 
Washington-based International Financial Insti-
tutions (IFIs), notably the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
2. The PBSO, which is a relatively small bureaucratic entity 
located within the Executive Office of the Secretary Gen-
eral and, therefore, independent of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department 
of Political Affairs (DPA), that (a) provides administrative 
and analytical support to the PBC; and (b) is responsible 
for refining U.N. peacebuilding doctrine by developing 
best-practice notes and operational metrics, and for dis-
seminating these throughout the U.N. system and the 
larger peacebuilding community of practice. 
3. The PBF, which relies on voluntary contributions from 
member-states, multilateral donors, and individuals—and 
seeks to maintain a US $250 million replenishable  
fund available, was conceived as a quick-disbursement 
funding source for catalytic actions to address crises that 
may threaten a fragile peace or projects that temporarily 
fill gaps in a post-conflict country’s peacebuilding strat-
egy. 
Member-states that serve on the PBC are drawn from a series of func-
tional and organizational constituencies, or stakeholder groups: 
seven members from the Security Council (the Security Council’s 
permanent members automatically occupy five of these seats); seven 
members from the General Assembly; seven members from the Eco-
nomic and Social Council; five members from among the top ten 
Troop Contributing Countries to U.N. peace operations; and five 
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members from among the top ten financial contributors to U.N. 
peace operations.  Due consideration to regional balance is to be 
given in the implementation of this formula.  In the months follow-
ing passage of Resolution 1645, an enormous amount of energy went 
into establishing the specific criteria for PBC membership-eligibility 
for each stakeholder category and the procedures through which 
members would be selected from within each group. 
While the resolutions that created the PBC and its component 
parts contains a fair helping of ambiguous language and stray turns 
of phrase, its mandate centers on actions that might allow the PBC (i) 
to perform a coordinating function, herding together the hugely di-
verse array of aid agencies (official and non-governmental, national 
and international) working in a given post-conflict setting; and (ii) to 
ensure that optimal levels of funding are attained, that donors do not 
undermine one another in their choice of programmatic interven-
tions, and that internationally funded work is based on a thorough 
analysis of which state-rebuilding strategies have worked in the past, 
and why.  The resolution identified, in effect, three broad functions 
for the PBC:24
1. “To bring together all relevant actors to marshal re-
sources and to advise on and propose integrated strate-
gies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery”; 
2. “To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-
building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and 
to support the development of integrated strategies in 
order to lay the foundation for sustainable development”; 
and 
3. “To provide recommendations and information to im-
prove the coordination of all relevant actors within and 
outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to 
help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery 
activities and to extend the period of attention given by 
the international community to post-conflict recovery.” 
The vague language in which laws or legal agreements are expressed 
as often reflects uneasy compromise among those who framed them 
as it does intellectual laziness.  Ambiguous phrases and unspecified 
concepts are helpful to contracting parties who must find ways of de-
ferring conflict over certain matters—by expressing them in terms 
that invite future interpretive contention—in order to secure agree-
ment on other, related issues of immediate importance.  In the case 
of the PBC, the profusion of ambiguities has fueled efforts by various 
 24 S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 2. 
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actors throughout the U.N. system, and beyond, to use the new body 
to further their agendas and to enhance their visibility.  It has also, 
not surprisingly, caused stakeholders in each of the PBC’s three 
components to seek ways of demonstrating their component’s unique 
comparative advantage in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding. 
At this early stage in its institutional development, the PBC is still 
grappling with how its fuzzy mandate can be translated into opera-
tional terms.  Determining the precise relationship between the three 
pillars of the peacebuilding architecture is a major part of this proc-
ess.  For instance, the PBSO and the PBF both engage with the same 
country cases that the intergovernmental PBC does.  And, yet, both 
the PBSO and the PBF deal also with cases that are not on the PBC’s 
agenda, furnishing them with distinct organizational missions and 
identities. 
Similarly, the links between each of the three pillars and external 
actors continue to be subjected to trial-and-error experimentation.  It 
remains unclear, for instance, precisely how the PBC is to advise the 
Security Council or the General Assembly.  Proposing “integrated 
peacebuilding strategies” for the countries on its agenda is about as 
specific as it gets.  It is not apparent how detailed such strategies 
ought to be, how they should be carried out, or what the proper 
mechanisms for monitoring their implementation and impacts are.  
The only more or less unambiguous feature of the relationship be-
tween the PBC and external bodies has been the lack of operational 
authority that the PBC possesses over any U.N. department, agency, 
fund, office, or program. 
Despite these limitations, it was hoped that the PBC’s broad 
membership would furnish its deliberations with the clout necessary 
to play two crucial brokering roles.  The first, as mentioned above, 
would be a coordinating role, forging agreements among the many 
international agencies operating in post-conflict countries.  The PBC, 
working with the PBSO, was expected to perform a second, analytical 
function as well—that is, to draw on the experience of actors 
throughout the U.N. system and beyond to identify examples of “best 
practice” in post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building—these 
“lessons learned” to be disseminated throughout the international 
community of peacebuilding agencies. 
While the PBC was conceived as an advisory body to the Security 
Council—additional reporting to the General Assembly was included 
at the insistence of a highly vocal group of mainly developing coun-
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tries—the PBC’s architects25 still believed that the inclusion as non-
voting participants of U.N. bodies and other global or regional bodies 
most directly involved in post-conflict peacebuilding (including the 
IFIs), would make it a sufficiently comprehensive forum, convened at 
a high enough level, for binding commitments by agency principals 
to emerge through a process of facilitated negotiation.  The PBC 
would perform this function in two ways: first, through engagement 
with specific country cases (these having been referred by the Secu-
rity Council or the Secretary General, with the consent of the gov-
ernment concerned); and second, through its advisory function, 
which would take the form of recommendations rendered directly to 
the Security Council and the General Assembly as well as through the 
dissemination of best-practice guidelines in post-conflict state-
building. 
By adjusting our analytical perspective in two key respects—first, 
by focusing on institutional survival and the adaptability that makes 
such survival possible, and second, by assessing each of the PBC’s 
three components individually—we can discern how the PBC has 
used the less-visible aspects of its mandate to demonstrate its institu-
tional value-added. 
We turn now to an examination of how each of the PBC’s three 
components has leveraged a slice of the organization’s mandate to 
secure a niche within the international peacebuilding community.  
Institutional disaggregation is a critical factor in explaining the PBC’s 
ability to adapt to the unpromising institutional environment into 
which it was thrust at birth—an atmosphere wherein organizational 
interests within and beyond the United Nations work tirelessly to re-
make the still-plastic term peacebuilding into what they want it to 
mean.26
 25 It is worth noting that at least some supporters of the original PBC concept 
privately disown the compromise institution that member-states ultimately agreed 
upon, viewing the PBC as presently constituted as a disfigured version of their origi-
nal conception.  Interview with a consultant to one of Kofi Annan’s key advisers dur-
ing 2005, in New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2007); and interview with a high-ranking 
official from a developing country mission that played a central role in negotiating 
the PBC’s institutional design, in New York City, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2007). 
 26 For an analysis of the various (mainly self-serving) meanings attached to the 
term peacebuilding by bilateral aid agencies, multilateral institutions, and other in-
stitutional actors, see Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell & Laura 
Sitea, Peacebuilding: What Is in A Name?, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 35–58 (2007). 
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III. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PBC: COUNTERBALANCING THE IFIS 
Each of the three components of the peacebuilding architec-
ture—the intergovernmental PBC itself, the bureaucratic PBSO, and 
the PBF—must confront a unique set of challenges and face a distinct 
array of institutional stakeholders.  There are clear and intentional 
points of overlap between the three sub-institutions.  Were they not at 
least conceived as an integrated system, the PBC’s mission to promote 
coherence would appear even more unattainable than it does al-
ready.  In order to secure an organizational role for itself, each of the 
three institutional components must identify and play to its strengths.  
This entails, among other things, demonstrating its value to one or 
more constituencies in the wider international community.  Organ-
izational positioning of this type is more effective if buttressed by 
other sources of institutional legitimacy – for instance, association 
with a widely held norm, such as ‘human rights’ or ‘the protection of 
civilians.’27  The three PBC components do not necessarily share the 
same interests.  Indeed, not only are there significant points of fric-
tion among the three, there are serious conflicts within each of them 
as well. 
None of this should be surprising if we consider that the PBC is 
itself a site of contestation, another arena in which long-running po-
litical battles are played out.  These include ideological differences 
between groups of states: the North-South divide—the gulf separating 
the developing from the developed world—is perhaps the most visi-
ble.  As an arena for contestation, the PBC and its component parts 
also attract attention from bureaucratic and political interest groups 
(within and outside the United Nations) that seek a platform from 
which to advance their agendas and amplify their organizational 
voices.28
 27 This distinction, which might usefully be contrasted as output and input le-
gitimacy, is contained within several of the contributions to THE LEGITIMACY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001). 
See Gerd Junne, International Organizations in a Period of Globalization: New (Problems of) 
Legitimacy, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATINOAL ORGANIZATIONS 189–220 (2001); 
Jean-Marc Coicaud, International Democratic Culture and Its Sources of Legitimacy: The 
Case of Collective Security and Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s, in THE LEGITIMACY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 256–308 (2001). 
 28 Both civil society groups and bureaucratic actors have repeatedly pointed to 
the PBC as a key institution for the advancement of sectoral or thematic issues of par-
ticular concern to them.  For instance, in late-2006, the Secretary General’s represen-
tative on Human Rights for Internally Displaced Persons informed the General As-
sembly’s “Third Committee” that he expected the PBC “to be an extremely 
important body to address situations of internal displacement.”  Press Release, Gen-
eral Assembly, Expert in Third Committee Cites “Suprising Lack of Awareness” 
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The PBC’s intergovernmental machinery, as noted, consists of 
both an Organizational Committee and Country Specific Configura-
tions, in which PBC members (plus an assortment of other invitees, 
including the IFIs) consider cases on the PBC’s agenda.  Burundi and 
Sierra Leone were the only two cases on the PBC’s agenda for its first 
eighteen months in existence, with Guinea Bissau and the Central Af-
rican Republic added in late-2007 and mid-2008, respectively.  The 
designers of the new U.N. peacebuilding architecture considered its 
intergovernmental pillar the institution’s crucial feature: the collec-
tive moral weight of member-states, with their links to systems of 
popular political representation, was seen as an indispensable tool for 
international “engagement” with countries attempting to transit from 
war to peace. 
In the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone—the two cases on 
which this essay focuses—the PBC has not necessarily brought about 
the deep, strategic coherence among external development actors 
that its architects may originally have hoped for,29 let alone more 
harmonious relations between international agencies and post-
conflict governments themselves.  In fact, there is some evidence that 
the PBC has in some cases exacerbated latent antagonisms between 
Burundi and Sierra Leone, on the one hand, and their respective in-
ternational donors, on the other.  This is the antithesis of coordina-
tion. 
Paradoxically, these heightened tensions, which are little more 
than a ratcheting-up of the donor-recipient sparring that goes on all 
the time, have contributed to enhanced coherence of another kind.  
In particular, by broadcasting donor-recipient squabbles to a wider 
audience of member-states and other important stakeholders, the 
PBC’s structured deliberations have created openings for a coalition 
of (mainly) developing country member-states, abetted by motivated 
elements within the United Nations’s extended bureaucracy, to 
counter what is widely regarded as the excessive influence of the 
Washington-based IFIs in fragile and post-conflict countries.  It has 
Among Government Officials of Torture as Most Serious Human Rights Violation, 
U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3860 (Oct. 23, 2006).  The jockeying for position began even 
before the PBC came into being.  See Building a New Role for the United Nations: The Re-
sponsibility to Protect, (Carlos Espósito & Jessica Almqvist eds., FRIDE, Working Paper 
No. 12, 2005), available at http://www.fride.org (click on the “Publications” tab, and 
then on the link for 2005 articles).  
 29 Interview with an official from a developing country mission to the United Na-
tions, New York City, N.Y. (Nov. 7, 2008). 
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long been a complaint among U.N. staff and academics30 that the 
rigid economic policy prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF 
are a significant problem from a peacebuilding perspective.  For in-
stance, an insistence on privatization—whether on narrow fiscal 
grounds or for other reasons—can, under certain circumstances, 
prove disastrous, depriving states of the opportunities to accommo-
date potential spoilers with high-level positions beyond the security 
sector—posts with significant patronage potential that could form the 
foundations of a (non-violent) political career.31  A shrinking public 
sector payroll in general can prove problematic when the promise of 
government jobs, to be distributed among competing groups on the 
basis of a negotiated formula, was integral to the structure of a given 
peace agreement. 
Whatever the merits or shortcomings of privatization (or state 
retrenchment generally) as a policy choice, the relevant point is that 
policy outcomes that IFI officials might regard as unpleasant but un-
avoidable economic dislocations—short-term corrections undertaken 
to secure higher long-term growth—often have extremely grave po-
litical and security implications that go unnoticed.32  Policy deci-
sions—particularly those with a fiscal dimension, or those which have 
distributional implications of a spatial nature, especially if the deci-
sion maps onto a particular pattern of ethnic geography—can all too 
easily undermine extremely delicate mediation and verification proc-
esses that U.N. officials and other diplomatic actors have in some 
cases spent years setting in motion.  In private conversations, U.N. of-
ficials specializing in post-conflict environments complain that their 
work in post-conflict countries is directly undermined by inflexible 
IFI policy, which tends to regard as wasteful subsidies the state-
rebuilding activities that are necessary to convince large numbers of 
people that peace dividends do exist and will continue to be forth-
 30 See, e.g., ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 167 
(2004) (that “neoliberal” policies had been thrust on post-conflict states in ways that 
threatened the establishment of a sustainable peace was a key argument of the au-
thor); Roland Paris, Broadening the Study of Peace Operations, 2 INT’L STUD. REV. 27, 35–
36 (2000)  (explaining the role of ideas, as opposed to interests or institutions, in the 
adoption of this overall policy framework). 
 31 This is a consistent theme in the research emerging from the Crisis States Pro-
gramme Development Research Centre, which is funded by the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development.  See James Putzel, Politics, the State and the 
Impulse for Social Protection: The Implications of Karl Polanyi’s Ideas for Understanding De-
velopment and Crisis, (Crisis States Programme Working Paper No.18, 2002), available 
at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/WP18JP.pdf. 
 32 See generally MARK DUFFIELD, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW WARS: THE 
MERGING OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY (2001). 
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coming if agreements are heeded and a democratic culture becomes 
entrenched.33  U.N. officials also argue that Security Council man-
dates to prevent the recurrence of violence should not be hemmed in 
by economic orthodoxy.  The early phases of peacebuilding almost by 
definition involve more strengthening of the state’s hand in the 
economy than orthodox economists would generally feel comfortable 
advocating.  This is a built-in tension that the PBC may prove able to 
dampen. 
Officials in the United Nations’s specialized agencies have long 
sought ways of countering the IFIs’s influence over national devel-
opment planning in aid-recipient countries.34  Indeed, the promotion 
of the concept of human development in the 1980s, and its institu-
tionalization in the form of the annual Human Development Report, can 
be seen as part of a larger effort on the part of U.N. actors to restore 
balance between the two institutional clusters—the IFIs and the U.N. 
system.  The objective was to establish rough parity in the levels of in-
fluence of, on the one hand, the IFIs (which possess greater financial 
resources) and, on the other hand, the U.N. system (which generally 
possess greater legitimacy resources).35  The impulse toward institu-
tional equality continues.  From 2006 to 2007, the United Nations 
commissioned a study to identify (and assess the merits of) methods 
for increasing the United Nations’s “voice” in the creation of national 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).36
 33 Interview with a high-ranking official of one of the United Nations’s key social 
development agencies, in New York City, N.Y. (Dec. 12, 2006). 
 34 As Ramesh Thakur, a long-time observer of the United Nations, stated, “[T]he 
U[nited] N[ations] was instrumental in broadening the concept of development to 
make it more human . . . .  Since the 1980s this has taken the form of constructive 
dissent to the prevailing Washington consensus among the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the US Treasury.”  RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, 
PEACE AND SECURITY 360 (2006). 
 35 The Human Development Report was established and named precisely to contrast 
with the World Bank’s productivity-, growth-, and trade-oriented World Development 
Report.  For an account of the personalities and ideas that spurred the creation of the 
Human Development Report Office, located within the UNDP but possessing its own 
mandate from the General Assembly, see TATIANA CARAYANNIS ET AL., UN VOICES: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2005). 
 36 The commissioned study, The UN and PRSPs: Process, Content, and Outcomes Amid 
Changes in the Architecture of Aid, which covered of eight countries, was conducted for 
the United Nations Development Program by an interdisciplinary group of scholars 
based at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, from 2006 to 
2008. Among the more revealing country reports emerging from this study were 
James Manor, The United Nations and Zambia’s Fifth Plan: Process, Content and Outcomes 
amid Changes in the Architecture of Aid (2007), available at http://www.undg.org/ 
docs/8969/Zambia-PRS-study.pdf. 
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Creating and sticking to a national PRSP is a requirement that 
recipient governments must fulfill to be eligible for concessional 
lending or long-term debt-relief from the IFIs.  A country’s PRSP 
spells out a comprehensive, operationalized vision of how the state, 
international donors, and civil society will collaborate to achieve na-
tional human development objectives, progress on which will be 
monitored by a national statistical office.  But from the point of view 
of many field-based U.N. officials, the priorities and concerns of the 
IFIs receive disproportionate weight when national authorities devise 
the terms of reference for statistical offices.37  Moreover, approval by 
the governing bodies of the IFIs to a large degree determines entry-
point eligibility for funding programs supported by bilateral aid do-
nors (USAID, UK DFID, Sweden’s SIDA, etc.).  This leads national 
authorities in aid-recipient countries—including, but not limited to, 
those in post-conflict states—to be unduly influenced (in the eyes of 
critics) by World Bank and IMF staff, who assiduously cultivate rela-
tionships with government officials from aid-recipient countries.  This 
frequently involves temporary Washington consultancies, training 
opportunities, and study leaves for those deemed promising.  The 
IFIs additionally possess a much larger cadre of professional, techni-
cally capable economists, covering almost every sub-discipline, which 
provides the World Bank and the IMF a serious agenda-setting advan-
tage.38
Of course, there is considerable doubt as to just how powerful 
the IFIs are in the countries where they operate.  This has been a 
longstanding concern in the study of the IFIs and the aid community 
more generally.39  There are two dimensions to this vein of skepti-
cism, concerning respectively: (a) how much autonomy IFI officials 
and Executive Board members genuinely possess vis-à-vis the leading 
states that collectively control the management of these institutions; 
and (b) how much leverage the World Bank and the IMF can exert in 
 37 Rob Jenkins & Maxton Tsoka, Institutionalization and Malawi’s PRSP, 21 
DEVELOPMENT POL’Y REV. 197, 197–215 (2003). 
 38 Lyla Mehta, From Darkness to Light? Critical Reflections on the World Development 
Report 1998–99, 36 J. DEVELOPMENTAL STUD. 151, 151–61 (1999) (discussing the 
World Bank’s various attempts to attain ideological hegemony over the field of de-
velopment practice). 
 39 The failure of conditionality-based development was a subject of considerable 
academic research in the 1990s.  See, e.g., PAUL MOSELY, JANE HARRIGAN & JOHN TOYE, 
AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING (1991); Nicolas van de 
Walle & Timothy A. Johnston, Improving Aid to Africa, (Overseas Development Coun-
cil, Policy Essay No. 21, 1996); Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and 
Growth, (World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper No. 1777, 1997). 
JENKINS (FINAL) 12/3/2008  1:18:23 PM 
1344 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1327 
 
their negotiations with individual debtor states to change behaviors 
and/or outcomes.   
Even so, U.N. agencies continue to be disconcerted by World 
Bank and IMF dominance of national economic planning.  This has 
been the case in highly indebted and aid-dependent countries in 
general (for instance, in Malawi);40 but animosity toward IFI domi-
nance of the PRSP process has been particularly acute in post-conflict 
countries, where the United Nations’s acknowledged preeminence in 
security matters causes U.N. officials to demand a lead role in such 
contexts.41
This pent-up rancor immediately spilled over into the operation 
of the PBC once it was up and running with an initial caseload of two 
post-conflict countries (Burundi and Sierra Leone).  Given the depth 
of feeling on both sides of the U.N./IFI divide, it is little surprise that 
various U.N. actors have sought to transform the PBC into a lever for 
enhancing the U.N. system’s influence over policy and institutional 
development in post-conflict states. 
Indeed, one of the PBC’s potentially most important functions 
could be to counter the influence of the World Bank and the IMF 
over economic policy in post-conflict countries.42  The support for 
this kind of role not only reflects the views of PBC members from de-
veloping countries, many of which consider themselves past or cur-
rent victims of high-handed actions by World Bank and IMF staff; it 
also corresponds with the perception of many donor governments 
and U.N. staff members that the approaches taken by the IFIs are of-
ten simply too rigid in post-conflict contexts.  Partly, the critique re-
flects a belief that IFI policy prescriptions are excessively market-
oriented.  A number of U.N. actors (bureaucratic and political) have 
thus coalesced around the position that the PBC could be a useful in-
strument for rectifying a perceived imbalance between the degree of 
influence wielded by, respectively, U.N. missions in post-conflict 
 40 See Linda Waldman, The United Nations and the Malawian Growth and Development 
Strategy Paper: Process, Content and Outcomes amid Changes in the Architecture of Aid 
(2007), available at http://www.undg.org/docs/8969/Malawi-IDS-study.pdf. 
 41 See Steve Darvill, Humanitarian, Multilateral and Community Programs Branch 
AusAID, Address at the Conference on Post-Conflict Assistance (July 11, 2002) (tran-
script available at http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/conflict/darvill.htm).  (noting 
“the utility of the PRSP process as a peace-building tool”). 
 42 Interview with a high-ranking official from a developing country mission that 
played a central role in negotiating the PBC’s institutional design, in New York City, 
N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2007). 
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countries and the IFI staff who negotiate policy-reform agendas with 
the governments of these countries.43
The influence of a U.N. mission, if headed by a strategically 
minded Special (or Executive) Representative of the Secretary Gen-
eral (SRSG or ERSG, respectively), is of course at its height during 
the immediate post-conflict stage, when U.N. forces are on the 
ground in large numbers.  As the security situation stabilizes and 
comes increasingly under the control of a state’s sovereign authori-
ties, and U.N. forces are drawn down, the clout of U.N. mission per-
sonnel begins to diminish.  In contrast, the World Bank and the IMF 
are enjoined by their charters from engaging in a full array of donor 
activities in countries where legitimate national authorities are not yet 
fully installed.  But as circumstances change and a more predictable 
legal framework returns, the role of the World Bank and the IMF ex-
pands enormously, as we shall see. 
It is in this context that an impressive cross-section of PBC mem-
ber-states has rallied behind the currently fashionable aid-community 
rhetoric of “national ownership”—the idea that policy and institu-
tional reforms cannot, and should not, be imposed on recipient 
countries through conditionality-based aid agreements.  This preoc-
cupation with reaffirming the principles of the March 2005 Paris Dec-
laration on Aid Effectiveness44 (which calls for donors to take a back 
seat to national authorities in devising development strategies) re-
flects the large representation of developing countries in the PBC 
and their longstanding frustration with the IFIs, whose commitment 
to Paris principles is considered suspect among developing country 
governments as well as international civil society.45
 43 The need for a coherent U.N. response to continued World Bank/IMF he-
gemony—and therefore the utility of a coordinating institution such as the PBC—
was stressed in an interview with a senior official in the U.N. Department of Econom-
ics and Social Affairs (DESA), in New York City, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2008). 
 44 The Paris Declaration was an outcome of the “High Level Forum on Aid Effec-
tiveness,” held in Paris from February 28 through March 2, 2005, which included 
representatives of donor and recipient countries, multilateral institutions, and civil 
society organizations.  The Forum was the culmination of a deliberative process un-
dertaken by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices, established 
in 2003 by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  World Bank, 
High Level Forum, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, 
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability (2005), available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/harmonization/Paris/finalparisdeclaration.pdf.   
 45 See, e.g., ActionAid International, What Progress? A Shadow Review of World Bank 
Conditionality (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/ 
what_progress.pdf; Goran Hyden, After the Paris Declaration: Taking on the Issue of 
Power, 26 DEVELOPMENT POL’Y REV. 259, 259–74 (2008) (explaining the reasons why it 
is difficult to determine the content of national ownership). 
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The move toward a “balancing” role for the PBC vis-à-vis the IFIs 
is reflected in two developments during the PBC’s first eighteen 
months in existence.  The first involved the means of operationaliz-
ing the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBSs) devised for Bu-
rundi and Sierra Leone by the PBC in consultation with officials from 
these governments, with civil society representatives, and with a broad 
range of external stakeholders.46  These IPBSs, or “Framework” 
documents, as noted earlier, draw liberally on existing national strat-
egy papers, including each country’s PRSP or PRSP-equivalent.  The 
process of devising a Framework document does, however, provide 
the PBC (and the U.N. system by extension) the chance to influence 
national priorities by indicating which actions are of immediate prac-
tical importance to the maintenance of peace and political stability. 
In terms of process, the PBC has also sought to ensure that the 
United Nations’s voice is given sufficient amplification, and its stature 
as the primary international organization responsible for maintaining 
peace and security formally reaffirmed.  An important victory—
symbolically, at least—in the U.N. system’s quest for parity with the 
IFIs is the “monitoring and tracking” mechanisms devised by the PBC 
for overseeing the implementation of the Peacebuilding Frameworks 
for Burundi and Sierra Leone.47  Despite the weakness of their en-
forcement provisions, the formal reporting relationships outlined in 
these monitoring procedures make clear that the review of the na-
tional Peacebuilding Frameworks happens in parallel to, and should 
carry the same weight as, the IFI-led reviews of national PRSPs.48 
Commitments under the United Nations’s Development Assistance 
Framework and the IFI-led PRSP are accorded equal significance and 
operational relevance (at least in the eyes of the PBC).49
The second indication that the intergovernmental PBC is carv-
ing out a role for itself as a counterweight to the IFIs’ dominance 
over economic policy and governance reform issues is more substan-
tive in nature and has had practical implications in both countries on 
 46 S.C. Res. 1645, supra note 1, ¶ 21 (specifying the provision regarding consulta-
tion with civil society).  Elsewhere in the resolution, the term “local groups” is used.  
Id. 
 47 See, e.g., U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation 
Framework, ¶¶ 30–35, PBC/2/SLE/1 (Dec. 3, 2007); U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, 
Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Bu-
rundi, PBC/2/BDI/4 (Nov. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Monitoring the Burundi Framework]. 
 48 An indication of the mild nature of the follow-up action recommend as part of 
the monitoring process can be found in U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Recommenda-
tions of the Biannual Review of the Implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuild-
ing in Burundi, ¶¶ 5, 11, 31, PBC/2/BDI/9 (June 23, 2008). 
 49 Monitoring the Burundi Framework, supra note 47, at ¶¶ 27(b), 28(c). 
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the PBC’s agenda.  Some PBC members claim that on certain rare 
but significant occasions during the PBC’s first 18 months in exis-
tence the World Bank and the IMF felt compelled to modify (or at 
least be seen to be rethinking) their approaches to Burundi and Si-
erra Leone.  These course corrections, it is asserted, resulted from 
pressure by PBC members deliberating collectively.50
The most frequently cited example was the PBC’s response to 
Burundi’s budgetary crisis during the summer and autumn of 2007.  
As explained below, this case involved the IMF in one of its least 
popular roles—as a reform ‘gatekeeper’ that must certify the macro-
economic rectitude of recipient governments before even bilateral 
donor funds can legally begin flowing. 
In September 2007, the chair of the PBC’s Country-Specific Con-
figuration (CSC) for Burundi (the Permanent Representative from 
Norway) visited Burundi to apprise himself of recent developments 
and to assess the general condition of the country’s core institutions.  
Following the Chair’s return to New York, the PBC held a series of 
meetings at which his findings were discussed.  The visit to Burundi 
had highlighted a number of problems.  Some of these challenges 
were by then reasonably well known by key members of the interna-
tional community, not least because they had been discussed in for-
mal and informal settings in Bujumbura over the previous several 
months.51  Many of the acute difficulties that were facing the country 
were political in nature, such as the breakdown of the agreement un-
der which Burundi’s remaining rebel forces were to be disarmed and 
the parliamentary gridlock that was preventing the passage of legisla-
 50 Interview with an official in one of the three institutional pillars of the U.N. 
peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (July 1, 2008). 
 51 See U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Report of the mission of the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion to Burundi, ¶¶ 9, 15, 18, PBC/1/BDI/2 (May 21, 2007).  For a chronology of the 
deteriorating situation in Burundi, see the successive reports of the Secretary Gen-
eral to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi mission (known by its 
French acronym, BINUB).  The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, delivered to the Security Council, S/2007/287 
(May 17, 2007) (a hopeful report given investment by subregional states, especially 
South Africa, in monitoring the peace); The Secretary-General, Second Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, delivered to the Security 
Council, S/2007/682 (Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Burundi, Second Report] (provid-
ing a bleaker assessment); The Secretary-General, Third Report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, delivered to the Security Council, 
S/2008/330 (May 15, 2008) (conveying the Secretary General’s view that Burundi 
had relapsed into violence). 
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tion to which the government had committed itself in negotiations 
with donors.52
But the issue that received the most direct attention from PBC 
member-states was Burundi’s perilous fiscal situation.  Burundi’s dire 
economy has its roots in a wide variety of complex developmental pa-
thologies.  What was causing the immediate pain in mid-2007, how-
ever, was fairly straightforward: the government was effectively bank-
rupt.  Burundi had borrowed as much as international markets (and 
official institutions) were willing to lend it.  The donors that Burun-
dian leaders were hoping might bail them out were unable to act be-
cause most bilateral and multilateral agencies operate under financial 
rules that prohibit the disbursement of aid until, as mentioned, the 
government’s handling of the macroeconomy is certified by the IMF. 
The Chair’s mission report noted that the deteriorating social, 
political, and economic situation was being seriously exacerbated by 
the IMF’s failure to complete the Sixth (and Final) Review of Bu-
rundi’s economic situation, as required under the terms of the IMF’s 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility53 financing agreement with Bu-
rundi.  The delay in completing the Review was widely seen as a nego-
tiating tactic deployed by the IMF, which was seeking action from the 
Burundian authorities on unimplemented reform measures.54  The 
practical result of this stand-off was that $93 million in bilateral and 
other multilateral budget support for 2007 could not reach Burundi’s 
treasury. 
In the course of the PBC’s subsequent deliberations, Burundi’s 
permanent representative to the United Nations expressed his gov-
ernment’s concern regarding the IMF’s inflexible and doctrinaire 
approach to his country’s financial-cum-political crisis.55  To cope 
with Burundi’s budgetary crisis, the IMF allegedly pressed the gov-
ernment to reduce the burden on the exchequer by raising the price 
 52 Int’l Crisis Group, Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, Africa Report No. 13, 
Aug. 28, 2007. 
 53 The IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) offers concessional 
finance at 0.5% per annum to qualifying countries.  The loans are repayable over ten 
years, with a sixty-six-month grace period on principal payments.  Such loans are very 
attractive to governments of poor countries with weak or non-existent tax bases.  See 
Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm. 
 54 Interview with an official working in one of the three institutional pillars of the 
U.N. peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 2007). 
 55 Provisions referred to in some instances are those found in documents such as 
IMF, Burundi: Fifth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility and Request for Waiver of a Performance Criterion—Staff Report (Mar. 21, 2007); 
Press Release, IMF, Executive Board Discussion (Mar. 21, 2007). 
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at which state-owned distributors sold petroleum.56  Such an ap-
proach, Burundi’s ambassador told the PBC, ignored the fragile na-
ture of Burundi’s political situation, which had been unsettled not 
only by continued difficulties in implementing an agreement be-
tween the government and remaining rebel forces, but also by a se-
ries of destabilizing political events, including a strike threat by mag-
istrates.  An absence of budget support meant that the government 
could not meet its core civil service payroll, a recipe for further insta-
bility. 
Egypt, Jamaica, and other typically vocal Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) members chimed in sympathetically and quickly requested 
more detailed information from the IMF on the nature of its negotia-
tions with the Burundian authorities.57  Corruption had been a key 
element of the IMF’s “governance concerns” during negotiations with 
Burundi’s leaders over the timing and terms of reference for the 
Sixth Review.  Burundi’s representative informed PBC members that 
his government had met almost eighty percent of the policy and insti-
tutional reform benchmarks set by the IMF, and that disrupting the 
flow of funds was not going to make achieving the other twenty per-
cent any easier.  He characterized the IMF’s concerns about nepotism 
and probity in public office as an unwarranted extrapolation built 
upon a single incident of corruption, which the government had (al-
legedly) already addressed.58
In a statement that invoked the PBC’s mandate to promote co-
ordination, the Burundian representative suggested, in a euphemistic 
formulation that attracted as much attention as it deflected, that 
“[p]erhaps the IMF was not working hand-in-hand with the [PBC].”59  
Burundi’s position, combined with support from Egypt, South Africa, 
Rwanda, Angola—and to a lesser extent other members of the PBC as 
well—cast a stark spotlight on the work of the IMF. 
For the first time since the PBC had come into being, the IMF 
began deputing high-level officials to engage in dialogue with the 
PBSO.  After the formal discussion of the Chair’s report these more 
senior IMF representatives met with PBC members to discuss the Bu-
 56 The long-term effects of not doing so may well have been felt in any case.  IMF, 
Food and Fuel Prices—Recent Developments, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Responses, 
June 30, 2008, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/ 
063008.pdf.  
 57 Press Release, U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Peacebuilding Commission 
Adopts Recommendations to Shore Up Peace in Burundi, U.N. Doc. PBC/21 (Sept. 
19, 2007). 
 58 Id.  
 59 Id.  
JENKINS (FINAL) 12/3/2008  1:18:23 PM 
1350 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1327 
 
rundi situation.60  The IMF was given a stern “talking to” from several 
PBC member-states—particularly those developing countries, such as 
India, that were keen to showcase their anti-IFI credentials given the 
growing perception among NAM countries that India had strayed too 
far into the strategic orbit of the United States.  The PBC, as usual, 
proved an irresistible forum for advancing the interests of its mem-
bers, sometimes in unpredictable and circuitous ways.61
The PBC followed its initial deliberations by issuing a report on 
the Burundi situation that outlined a series of “conclusions” and 
“recommendations.”62  The report conceded the need for change in 
Burundi, and recommended that the Government of Burundi “inves-
tigate fully and immediately recent governance issues and take neces-
sary steps to strengthen government controls over its expenditures to 
effectively prevent misuse and misappropriation of public funds.”63  
But the PBC was unusually direct in recommending to the IFIs that 
they “take into account, in the context of the ongoing dialogue be-
tween the IMF and the Government of Burundi, the fragile situation 
in the country in early disbursement of financial support.”64  The re-
port also suggested that the World Bank and the IMF “continue to ac-
tively follow-up on the commitments made at the May 2007 Round 
Table and consider additional and/or alternative financial support 
in the context of the fragile budgetary situation, bearing in mind the 
dire needs of the population.”65
In related aid-coordination meetings during that period, IMF of-
ficials were said to have demonstrated much greater flexibility.66 On 
September 20, 2007, The day after the PBC’s recommendations on 
Burundi were issued, the IMF executive board decided to grant an 
exceptional waiver to Burundi that extended funding under the Pov-
erty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  This allowed the gov-
ernment of Burundi to stabilize its fiscal position, alleviating some of 
 60 Interview with an official working in one of the three institutional pillars of the 
U.N. peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 2007). 
 61 Interview with a representative of a prominent developing-country PBC mem-
ber-state, in New York City, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2008). 
 62 Chairman of the Burundi Configuration of the PBC, Identical Letters Dated 20 
September 2007 from the Chairman of the Burundi Configuration of the Peacebuilding Com-
mission, at 2–4, delivered to the President of the Security Council, the President of the General 
Assembly, and the President of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. PCB/2/BDI/2 
(Sept. 19, 2007). 
 63 Id. at 3. 
 64 Id. at 4. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Interview with a U.N. mission staff member of a major European bilateral do-
nor country, in New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 1, 2008). 
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the political uncertainty that had in part stalled the government’s leg-
islative agenda. 
In mid-January 2008, the IMF formally completed the Sixth (and 
Final) Review of Burundi’s PRGF program.67  The IMF’s official ex-
planation for release of the final tranche of funding under the PRGF 
cited the government’s pursuit of what it considered sound macro-
economic policies.68  But the IMF also referred, obliquely, to the pol-
icy- and performance-related reasons for the delay in completing the 
Review in the first place, not all of which, it was obvious, were dealt 
with by the Burundian government.  IMF officials stressed the results 
its engagement with the Burundian authorities had achieved, but 
there is reason to believe that the PBC’s intervention in Burundi’s 
dispute with the IMF contributed to Burundi’s ability to evade IMF 
conditions.69
Whether, in the absence of protest from PBC member-states, the 
IMF would have allowed the final $11.4 million tranche of PRGF 
funds to be released is counterfactual speculation that defies defini-
tive conclusions.  The PBC did, however, provide a high-profile fo-
rum in which a cross-section of the international community could 
collectively reaffirm the imperative of maintaining political stability in 
fragile states, and the need for other economic considerations—such 
as fiscal rectitude—to take an occasional backseat.  This created an 
environment in which IMF officials found it more difficult to take a 
hard line on the Burundian authorities for failing to live up to their 
reform commitments, not least because the PBC’s diverse member-
ship and its status as an advisory body of the Security Council (whose 
five permanent members are also represented on the PBC) invests its 
deliberations and pronouncements with considerable weight and le-
gitimacy. 
It is reasonable to ask whether pressure from developing country 
representatives at the UN would have any impact on IFI officials.  On 
their own, developing countries are indeed a weak lobby.  But when 
allied, on an issue-specific basis, with certain progressive northern 
donors, or even with one or more permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council, the voices favoring a less intrusive role for the IFIs be-
come more persuasive.  Skeptics might also wonder why well-off do-
 67 IMF, Burundi: Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria, Country Report No. 08/27 
(Jan. 23, 2008). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Interview with a U.N. consultant who specializes in police reform in post-
conflict countries, in New York City, N.Y. (Sept. 7, 2007). 
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nor governments would find it either advantageous or necessary to 
use the indirect route of PBC engagement in order to influence, say, 
the IMF.  Such governments are, in general, well represented on the 
boards of the IFIs.  The most plausible answer is that IFI policy tends 
to be dominated by a member-state’s finance ministry or economic 
advisers in the office of the president or prime minister, not by the 
foreign ministry.  So the PBC route, however indirect, offers foreign 
ministries—from whom U.N. delegations generally take their or-
ders—an indirect voice in the country-specific deliberations of the 
World Bank and the IMF.  When economic questions are translated 
as threats to the peace, as issues of basic regime stability, security offi-
cials more frequently prevail over their rivals from treasury.70
The PBC may not have tamed the IFIs or even reined in rogue 
U.N. agencies, which are often big and independent enough to ig-
nore pleas for bureaucratic coordination.  But the PBC’s ongoing en-
gagement with Burundi and Sierra Leone has provided a platform 
from which alternative views on the role of the IFIs in post-conflict 
countries can get a hearing.  The view that conflict-reducing meas-
ures must increasingly trump economic policy preoccupations has 
been a consistent theme among a vocal minority of scholars and prac-
titioners.71  One analyst, who has served as a senior official in both the 
United Nations and the IMF, has argued that economic orthodoxies 
must yield to security considerations.  The former official acknowl-
edged the difficulty she had faced in trying to convince IFI decision-
makers of the exceptional nature of post-conflict environments.  
World Bank and IMF officials—confronted with a distinct set of or-
ganizational incentives—tend to favor a limited menu of policy op-
tions.72
To conclude this analysis of the PBC’s intergovernmental ma-
chinery (including its Country-Specific Configurations, where much 
of the substantive action takes place), it is worth noting that the PBC 
has been able to perform other counterweight functions as well.  Just 
as the PBC was able to counteract the influence of the IFIs in limited 
 70 Interview with a senior Indian diplomat, in Phila., Pa. (Apr. 18, 2008). 
 71 This view is growing, however, and increasingly receives explicit support from 
member states.  See, e.g., Thematic Meeting on Diplomacy, Development, and Inte-
grated Planning in Fragile States, Oslo, Norway, Feb. 11–12, 2008, Final Outcome 
Summary.  This group of experts and practitioners, in its second recommendation, 
said, “Given the fragile context, political considerations and a conflict analysis are essen-
tial for international inventions” in the development field.  Id. at 1. 
 72 GRACIANA DEL CASTILLO, REBUILDING WAR-TORN STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF 
POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
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but important ways, the PBC may also emerge as an alternative source 
of information for Security Council deliberations. 
It has long been the custom that when the Security Council de-
liberates on mandate renewal or any other pending decision related 
to a post-conflict mission, it relies considerably on information pro-
vided by the highest resident U.N. official—the Special (or some-
times Executive) Representative of the Secretary General.  This in-
formation is provided in the form of direct oral briefings as well as 
through the Secretary-General’s Reports on individual country situa-
tions, which SRSGs play a very large role in producing. SRSGs are ac-
cused of shaping reports to reflect their personal biases or career 
ambitions.73  Aware of the potential for ulterior motives, Security 
Council members frequently eye SRSGs with suspicion. SRSGs are of-
ten seen as excessively cautious, fearing tensions with the host gov-
ernment, whose officials the SRSG must work with on a daily basis re-
gardless of the Security Council’s decision.  Other SRSGs have a 
reputation for prioritizing changes that can be accomplished within 
the time remaining in his or her tenure, whether or not such changes 
are priorities for peace.  Officials in the Secretariat responsible for 
compiling these country-specific reports attempt to make the findings 
more politically saleable, a process that is visible enough to spur fur-
ther doubts among Security Council members.74
Given that questions surrounding the value of the existing 
mechanisms of country-specific reporting, the Security Council would 
arguably benefit from an additional channel of information and 
analysis.  The PBC has managed to position itself as, potentially, a 
credible, if far from ideal, alternative.  This, its members and cham-
pions maintain, is because the PBC’s members travel regularly to the 
countries concerned, and because the PBC invites civil society groups 
to participate in its meetings (though NGOs are carefully screened by 
the governments whose cases are under the PBC’s consideration).75  
 73 The Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sierra Leone’s inte-
grated office mission (UNIOSIL) during 2006–2007, was widely regarded as secretive 
and unwilling to consult widely with U.N. agencies with a field presence in Freetown.  
Interview with an official working in one of the three institutional pillars of the U.N. 
peacebuilding architecture, in New York City, N.Y. (May 16, 2007). 
 74 On the changing role of SRSGs see Manuel Frohlich, The Peace Makers?  The 
Development of the Role of the Special Representatives of the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral as a roll of Conflict Resolution (June 7–8, 2007) (presented at the Annual Con-
ference of the Academic Council on U.N. Studies, New York City). 
 75 U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Organizational Comm., Provisional Report on the 
Work of the PBC, U.N. Doc. PBC/2/OC/L.1 (June 28, 2007); Peacebuilding Comm’n, 
Organizational Comm., Draft Report of the PBC on its 2nd Session, U.N. Doc. 
PBC/2/OC/L.2 (June 23, 2008). 
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PBC member-states have tried to make the case, in whichever forums 
they belong to, that the PBC is uniquely suited to provide an original, 
and less bureaucratically entrenched, perspective to the Security 
Council’s deliberations. 
Thanks to sustained lobbying by a number of states during the 
PBC’s early months, ad hoc invitations were extended by the Security 
Council to Chairs of the PBC’s two Country-Specific Configurations.76  
This precedent became firmly established in December 2007, when 
the chair of the PBC’s Burundi CSC briefed the Security Council.  He 
did so against the backdrop of continued instability in Burundi, at a 
time when the Security Council was considering the most recent Sec-
retary General’s report on the U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi 
(BINUB).77  That the CSC Chairs are themselves member-states af-
fords them a more or less respectful hearing from most Security 
Council members, who might otherwise be dismissive of yet more 
speechmaking by Secretariat apparatchiks.  That CSC Chairs have 
tended to come from influential countries—the first two were signifi-
cant donor states, and the third was an emerging power, Brazil—has 
also helped to ease their passage into the Security Council’s institu-
tional milieu.78
IV. THE PBSO: “KNOWLEDGE” AND INFLUENCE 
Among other things, this essay argues that in order to carve out 
a durable niche for itself, the PBC has effectively disaggregated itself 
into its component parts, each of which has been waging its own bat-
tle for institutional survival.  The analytical focus thus far has been on 
just one of the three components that make up the PBC: its intergov-
ernmental Commission itself, which includes the thirty-one-member 
Organizational Committee and the Country-Specific Configurations 
adopted to address specific post-conflict cases on its agenda.  For rea-
sons of space, only one of the other two PBC components—the 
PBSO, representing its bureaucratic dimension—is analyzed in depth 
here.  Certain similarities in the workings of the third PBC compo-
nent—the PBF, the PBC’s financial dimension—are briefly identified 
in the conclusion. 
 76 Interview with a U.N. mission staff member from a country that chaired one of 
the PBC’s first two Country Specific Configurations, in New York City, N.Y. (May 27, 
2007). 
 77 Burundi, Second Report, supra note 51. 
 78 The first three countries on the agenda were assigned the following CSC 
Chairs: the Netherlands chaired the Sierra Leone CSC, Norway chaired Burundi’s 
CSC, and Brazil chaired Guinea Bissau’s CSC. 
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The portion of Security Council Resolution 1645 that refers to 
the PBSO specifies its limited role.79  The “Office” (not a full-fledged 
“Department”) was to be small and non-operational.  PBSO staff were 
“to assist and support the [PBC]” by, for instance, “gathering and 
analyzing information” of various types.80  This was to include infor-
mation concerning “the availability of financial resources, relevant 
U.N. planning activities, progress towards meeting short and me-
dium-term recovery goals, and best practices with respect to cross-
cutting, peacebuilding issues.”81
The process leading up to the establishment of the PBSO, as op-
posed to its legal authorization in Resolution 1645, was marked by 
steadfast opposition from developing countries to making the PBSO 
much more than a back-office for the PBC’s deliberations.  Negotia-
tions ensued in the General Assembly’s administrative and budget 
committees over extremely small sums and minor personnel issues.82  
A concern expressed in developing country delegations (both before 
and after passage of Resolution 1645) was that the PBC, and by ex-
tension the PBSO, could be a Trojan Horse that would allow the P5 
and other leading states to further infiltrate the United Nations’s 
economic and social agencies by emphasizing that development fail-
ures and imbalances are key contributors to political instability and 
conflict, issues squarely in the Security Council’s remit. 
At least two factors have helped to make the PBSO potentially a 
more formidable institutional actor than its modest statement of 
purpose might otherwise suggest.  First, as an independent “Office”—
that is, located within neither the Department of Peacekeeping Op-
erations (DPKO) nor the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)—the 
PBSO stands in direct, unmediated relation to the Executive Office of 
the Secretary General.  This would be less important if the only im-
plication was that the PBSO’s decisions could not be formally vetoed 
by intervening department bosses.  In practice, however, it means 
that the PBSO is provided a valuable point of entry into interagency 
 79 S.C. Res. 1645, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 The level of discord could be seen in the concluding paragraphs of the De-
cember 2005 Report by the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administra-
tive and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), on the proposed 2006–2007 budget, where 
the committee chastised the Secretary General for going beyond the remit of the 
2005 summit outcome in his preparations for the establishment of the PBSO.  See 
U.N Administrative & Bugetary Comm., The Peacebuilding Commission: Programme 
Budget Implications of Draft Resolution A/60/L.40, U.N. Doc. A/60/7/Add.25 (Dec. 16, 
2005). 
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structures of various types.  Exploiting such opportunities is part of 
the process by which the PBSO has begun occupying a set of unique 
organizational niches. 
Second, the PBSO is able to draw on the political clout of PBC 
member-states with whom it must work closely in its role as the secre-
tariat unit “supporting” the PBC’s intergovernmental machinery.  
The PBSO is able to do this while at the same time being able to dis-
tance itself from PBC member-states when autonomy is helpful to the 
PBSO’s pursuit of its own adaptive strategy for institutional survival. 
Two examples of the PBSO’s multipronged effort to occupy an 
organizational niche are discussed here.  Both illustrative cases are 
consciously rooted in what the PBSO calls its “second mandate”—its 
system-wide knowledge consolidation and dissemination role, as op-
posed to its function as a secretariat for the PBC’s intergovernmental 
deliberations.  The broad nature of this role was reaffirmed in a May 
2007 statement issued by the Secretary General’s Policy Committee.83  
This document is cited frequently by PBSO staff when seeking to jus-
tify their presence in one or another interagency process. 
Attempting to amass organizational influence by serving as a fo-
cal point for the collection and refinement of expert knowledge—
especially when this is based on analysis of internal organizational 
practices—is a bureaucratic strategy with a long and distinguished 
pedigree.  There is nothing particularly surprising about the PBSO 
pursuing this route.  In fact, recent scholarship on international or-
ganizations, particularly Barnett and Finnemore’s empirically wide-
ranging work, suggests that it is precisely by framing concepts, rela-
tionships, and processes in ways that require expert input to opera-
tionalize them that international bureaucracies seek to make them-
selves indispensable, expand their mandates, and (perhaps most 
significantly) wrest a degree of autonomy from member-states and 
the vagaries of intergovernmental bargaining.84
The first example of how the PBSO followed this strategy con-
cerns its involvement in the United Nations’s Integrated Mission 
Planning Process (IMPP).  U.N. departments and agencies involved 
in peace operations have long pressed for a more structured and in-
clusive process for determining whether, for any prospective country 
 83 The document, a memorandum from the Secretary General to Members of the 
Policy Committee (dated May 22, 2007) contained “Decision No. 2007/28 RE: 
Peacebuilding Support Office.”  The decision chiefly concerned the “Conceptual Ba-
sis for Peacebuilding,” which was effectively broadened, and a statement on the (ex-
panded) “Role of the Peacebuilding Support Office” (PBSO). 
 84 See, e.g., BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 6. 
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case, a multidisciplinary peace operation is feasible and what such an 
operation might look like given the exigencies of the present and the 
full life-cycle of an integrated U.N. mission—all the way to the point 
of “exit.”85  This has resulted in the IMPP “guidelines,” which remain 
a work in progress.  This foundational policy document outlines how 
the IMPP should work in practice.  It outlines phases, lead organiza-
tions, decision points, and so forth.  Its production entailed intense, 
line-by-line negotiations over an extended period of time and in-
volved a huge range of bureaucratic and political stakeholders.  Some 
of the roles and responsibilities, not to mention mandates and time-
frames, remained a point of contention up to the time of this writing 
in mid 2008. 
Even before the PBSO was fully functional, officials associated 
with its creation lobbied for the PBSO’s substantial inclusion in the 
IMPP guidelines in as many roles as possible.  These lobbying ef-
forts—only partly successful—benefited from the assistance of PBC 
states that supported the idea that the eventual transition to post-
conflict peacebuilding must be considered even in the early stages of 
devising a strategy for peacekeeping.   
The degree of contention over the PBSO’s potential role is ap-
parent from the various versions of this capstone document, formally 
entitled, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed 
by the Secretary-General.86  The tentative nature of PBSO involvement is 
evident from the version dated June 13, 2006, which was issued just as 
the PBC and the PBSO were coming formally into being.  As noted, 
lobbying on behalf of the PBSO had begun considerably earlier, with 
several donor states seeking to increase the new unit’s organizational 
heft—a strategy that, as we have seen, generated opposition (and 
much enlivened proceedings) in the General Assembly’s committee 
rooms.  Several roles for the PBSO and the PBC are envisaged.  But 
interpreting the guidelines is ultimately as much a matter of political 
negotiation as their formulation had been in the first place.  To date, 
 85 See Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, 
U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000). 
 86 A footnote in the June 13, 2006, version clarifies that the guidelines apply only 
to peace support operations occurring in a “post-conflict setting” where the U.N. 
“mounts multi-disciplinary peace support operations of which a peacekeeping mis-
sion is a component.”  U.N., INTEGRATED MISSIONS PLANNING PROCESS (IMPP): 
GUIDELINES ENDORSED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 13 JUNE 2006 (2006), available at 
www.undg.org/docs/8481/IMPP.pdf [hereinafter JUNE GUIDELINES].  The guidelines 
state explicitly that “[d]ifferent processes may apply for United Nations peace sup-
port operations where no peacekeeping operation is involved.”  Id. at 2. 
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the PBSO has proven reasonably adept at making the most of its 
marginal presence within the IMPP guidelines. 
The PBSO is mentioned in the preamble to the guidelines, 
which are structured like a decision-making flowchart, with various 
U.N. entities drawn into (and lifted out of) the activity matrix as their 
participation ebbs and flows.  There is mention of a (relatively un-
specified) role for the PBC in the “pre-decision” stage of the mission-
planning process.  “Prior to a decision by the Secretary General to 
initiate detailed planning,” the PBSO would (in order to provide the 
Security Council and other relevant actors with a full, longitudinal 
picture of the commitment envisaged) be “responsible for devising 
longer-term strategies to help countries fully recover from conflict, 
help bring the U.N. system together, and also draw together non-
U.N. actors, including IFIs and regional organizations in support of a 
common strategy.”87  This language echoes the wording of the resolu-
tion creating the PBC, but applies the tasks to the PBSO independently of 
the intergovernmental PBC.  According to the IMPP Guidelines, if a de-
cision is taken to begin more detailed planning for a potential (still yet 
unapproved) peace-support operation, three stages would ensue: (1) 
advanced planning; (2) operational planning; and (3) review and 
transition planning.  Each stage has multiple levels and triggers for 
decision-making and action. 
Two of the four triggers for initiating the IMPP involve the PBC 
and/or the PBSO: (i) “a recommendation by the [PBC], or a request 
by a Member State or regional organization, to the U.N. Secretary-
General to consider possible options, including a peace support op-
eration”; and (ii) “[t]he development by the PBC or PBSO of an 
overarching strategy for U.N. peacebuilding support.”88  Though the 
PBSO is not mentioned in the first of these, it would play a critical yet 
indirect role by shaping the analysis of the PBC’s “recommenda-
tion.”89  In practice, the PBSO will not trigger anything on its own.  It 
is nevertheless significant for a small U.N. entity to be part of the 
process for deciding which country situations are ripe for a mission-
level intervention. 
Once it is decided to “initiate the IMPP,” the “advanced plan-
ning” phase begins, carried out by an Integrated Mission Task Force 
(IMTF), which is led by the Department of Political Affairs, but with 
inputs from the PBSO.  The key activity during this initial stage of the 
IMPP is the “Strategic Assessment,” which outlines what functions the 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 5. 
 89 Id. at 5. 
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United Nations might credibly perform, what assumptions have been 
made about the nature of the conflict in question, and the potential 
scenarios that might affect the conduct of such a mission.  In doing 
so, the IMTF is expected to “draw on the strategic analysis of the 
PBSO,” among others.90
If it is determined that the Strategic Assessment provides a basis 
for moving forward, the Secretary General issues a Strategic Planning 
Directive, which outlines the objectives of the mission.  In the “opera-
tional planning stage,” the DPKO takes the lead.  The guidelines in-
dicate, however, that the draft Strategic Planning Directive would be 
prepared “in consultation with the PBSO,” providing another oppor-
tunity for the PBSO to shape, even if only at the margins, the parame-
ters of a proposed peace operation.91  The PBSO also has a role in the 
“review and transition planning” phase.  “[T]he PBSO should be 
regularly updated” on the conduct of the mission, the purpose being 
to allow input from the PBSO on the likely implications of decisions 
that will profoundly affect the post-conflict environment and, there-
fore, the range of options facing peacebuilding agencies.92
The section of the guidelines on “Initiating Transition and Exit 
Planning” indicates that the “Mission Plan should contain triggers 
and benchmarks for initiating transition and exit planning,” and that 
these will have been “developed in close collaboration with,” among 
other entities, the PBSO.93  The issue of “transition” (an operation’s 
multi-stage exit from a post-conflict situation) is also reflected in the 
second example of the PBSO’s ability to adapt itself to a difficult en-
vironment.  Indeed, the PBSO has sought to make use of its knowl-
edge consolidation and dissemination role in order to influence what 
it sees as a key Security Council priority—understanding the condi-
tions that can facilitate exit. 
To influence the Security Council’s decisions regarding the 
gradual drawing-down of peace operations, the closing of post-
conflict missions, or indeed Security Council doctrine on transitions 
more generally, the PBSO saw the need to combine its knowledge-
consolidation mandate with its participation in relevant interagency 
initiatives.  Among the forums in which the PBSO has been engaged 
is the U.N. Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination on Early 
Warning and Preventive Action.  The “Framework Team,” as it is 
known, is coordinated by the UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention 
 90 Id. at 6. 
 91 Id. at 7. 
 92 JUNE GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 8–12. 
 93 Id. at 15. 
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and Recovery.  Its mission is to refine methods for anticipating the 
outbreak of violence, assessing the likely severity of nascent conflicts, 
and recommending the most appropriate programmatic interven-
tions.94
The Framework Team maintains an informal “watch list”—
though it does not use this term—of countries to be monitored, 
which includes those residing in conflict-ridden regions.  It devotes 
attention to all countries where regime stability is threatened by sys-
temic violence—not just states “emerging from conflict,” which is the 
PBC’s designated area of responsibility.95  The Framework Team—
which seeks to expand the remit and enhance the stature of the 
Peace and Development Advisors it has helped to deploy in various 
conflict zones—provides a point of access for the PBSO into a policy 
arena (conflict-prevention in states that have not recently experi-
enced war) where it is otherwise short on influence.96
Perhaps as importantly, the Framework Team provides a forum 
in which the PBSO can attempt to steer the debate on the conditions 
under which “transitions” (toward full de facto state sovereignty) are 
best undertaken.  The PBSO has done this by seeking space on the 
agenda of the Expert Reference Group (ERG), which supports the 
Framework Team in planning U.N. system-wide program interven-
tions by refining the analytical tools at its disposal.  The ERG, for in-
stance, assesses the relevance of competing models of conflict dynam-
ics and the applicability of various risk indicators.97
The PBSO has cultivated relations with other agencies and of-
fices represented on the ERG and the Framework Team, and it has, 
in accordance with its mandate, attempted to influence the choice of 
analytical instruments used in assessing post-conflict situations.  In 
late-2007, the PBSO commissioned a study of potential transition in-
 94 The mission and structure of the Framework Team, as well as the Bureau of 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which is part of the U.N. Development Program, is 
available at http://www.undp.org/cpr/. 
 95 Id. 
 96 The Expert Reference Group associated with the Framework Team outlined its 
conclusions concerning the future role of the Peace and Development Advisors—
and hailed the “historic” work of the Framework Team itself.  Experience-Sharing 
and Capacity Development Workshop for U.N. Conflict Prevention and Peacebuild-
ing Practitioners to Enhance Conflict Prevention Programming, Oct. 30–Nov. 2, 
2007, The Naivasha Process Report.  
 97 The emphasis on analytical tools and the identification and dissemination of 
best practice is evident from a funding application devised by the Framework Team 
in 2006.  Memorandum from the U.N. Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 
Funding Proposal: Enhancing the Framework Team (May 2006) (on file with au-
thor).  
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dicators and relevant datasets whose findings were disseminated 
through the ERG.98  This represented an effort to build support for 
the creation of a model of conflict-to-peace analysis that could guide 
U.N. agencies in planning for the transition from a country situation 
defined by its post-conflict status to one focused on a longer-term de-
velopmental agenda.  The PBSO’s proposals received a mixed re-
sponse—at least in the early stages of the process covered in the re-
search for this essay—but the fact of having asserted a legitimate 
interest in this issue has positioned the PBSO to continue participat-
ing in negotiations on these and related matters. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This essay has argued that, despite the PBC’s weak mandate, its 
highly contingent “advisory” status, and its politically contentious ori-
gins, this still-fledgling body has emerged from its first two years in 
existence as a significant force in an unpromising institutional envi-
ronment.  The PBC and the PBSO are now visible actors in the com-
munity of international actors engaged in the rebuilding of post-
conflict states.  As envisaged by their architects, both institutions par-
ticipate in broader institutional discussions on the causes of violent 
conflict and the best means of preventing its eruption or recur-
rence.99  Given the speed with which newly minted international bod-
ies can begin slipping into terminal irrelevance almost from the mo-
ment of inception,100 this is a considerable accomplishment. 
The ability of the PBC to carve out a role for itself—even if its 
precise value-added is difficult to pin down—has rested on the rela-
tive freedom granted by Resolution 1645, which effectively allowed 
each of the PBC’s component parts (the three pillars of the U.N.’s 
‘peacebuilding architecture’) to pursue its own means of ensuring in-
stitutional survival.  It is worth noting that certain aspects of the 
PBC’s adaptive response challenge the conventional wisdom on why 
international organizations (IOs) evolve as they do.  The PBSO is a 
good example of a bureaucratic entity created by states not as a way of 
investing an existing IO with greater decision-making autonomy, the 
phenomenon with which most international relations scholarship is 
 98 Memorandum from the U.N. Peacebuilding Comm’n, Measuring Peace Con-
solidation and Supporting Transition, (Dec. 2007).  
 99 The need for such a capacity is evident from theoretically informed empirical 
research.  See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2003).
 100 A classic example is the long-dormant Military Staff Committee created under 
Article 47 of the United Nations Charter.  NAT’L WAR COLLEGE, THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE: RELIC OR REVIVAL? (1994). 
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concerned.  Indeed, discussions leading up to the creation of the 
PBC and the PBSO—and the subsequent negotiations over opera-
tional rules once the PBC had come formally into being—were 
marked by a strong insistence by many states that ambitions for the 
PBC be scaled back.  Initial plans for the PBSO to possess an “early 
warning” capacity—along the lines of what it is now engaged in 
through its work in the Framework Team—were successfully resisted 
by a coalition consisting mainly of developing-country member-states.  
Yet, the PBC and its various components have managed to find ways 
of “remaining relevant.”101
This essay has focused on two of the three pillars of the peace-
building architecture—the PBC and the PBSO.  But it should be 
noted that the third pillar, the PBF, has also managed to play an out-
sized role in the field of post-conflict financing—again, by stressing its 
autonomy from the PBSO and the PBC.  The PBF was dismissed 
originally by many observers as: (a) yet another multi-donor trust 
fund; (b) inadequate for the size of the peace and post-conflict op-
erations the United Nations would need to mount; and/or (c) too 
tethered to an intergovernmental process (the PBC), which would sti-
fle innovative ideas. 
Thanks to efforts by actors operating within the PBF’s 
multistakeholder governance structure, the PBF has become a far 
more important sub-institution than was initially predicted.  The Sec-
retary Generals’s cabinet now regards the PBF as a strategic re-
source—a pool of untied funds that can be used to initiate timely ac-
tion even in pre-conflict situations.  This is a complicated story that 
cannot be fully explicated here.  But the crucial point is that it was 
the creative interpretation of the PBF’s underspecified mandate and 
the vagueness concerning aspects of its institutional location, which 
allowed it to achieve the institutional relevance it now enjoys.  In ef-
fect, while the PBF responds to the requests of the PBC’s member-
states for catalytic funding in priority areas identified by its Country 
Specific Configurations, the PBF operates “windows” for other coun-
tries in crisis or at critical breaking points.  At this writing, these have 
included Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, and Li-
beria.  For donor countries that are not PBC members—and even for 
some that are—the PBF represents an attractive channel of influence.  
 101 Interview with a U.N. mission official from one of the leading aid-donor mem-
ber-states on the PBC, in New York City, N.Y., May 18, 2007. 
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Non-governmental advocacy organizations are similarly seeking to in-
fluence the procedures and priorities of the PBF’s grantmaking.102
Finally, let us briefly consider two factors that might shape the 
PBC’s institutional trajectory and the roles to be played by its various 
components. The first concerns the PBC’s future caseload.  If the 
PBC continues to be assigned cases, like Sierra Leone and Burundi, 
where conflicts are long past their “hot” phases, then the types of en-
gagement that the PBC can play will remain limited.  It will engage 
with governments for which aid priorities have, for the most part, al-
ready been agreed.  On the other hand, if countries are placed on 
the PBC’s agenda at a much earlier phase in the peacemaking proc-
ess—as is the case with Guinea Bissau and the Central African Repub-
lic—then the various pillars of the peacebuilding architecture are 
likely to encounter expanded opportunities for influence. 
The second factor that may make a difference in determining 
how the PBC’s component parts go about adapting to an institutional 
environment in which they remain, in many respects, minor players is 
the trajectory of other elements of U.N. reform.  To date, the PBC 
has benefited from certain aspects of the ongoing reform agenda.  It 
is often claimed, for instance, that the leading states represented in 
the PBC faced enormous pressure to avoid “failure” during its initial 
eighteen months in existence.  This is because the other main institu-
tional reform produced by the 2005 World Summit—the Human 
Rights Council—was being written off as little better than the discred-
ited Human Rights Commission it replaced.  At several low points in 
the PBC’s short history, its member-states, as well as the PBSO, have 
worked assiduously to dispel the impression that the PBC might be 
similarly dysfunctional.  This resulted in strenuous efforts to avoid de-
lays in meeting organizational milestones and to defuse conflict 
within the ranks of the PBC’s member-states.  Had this kind of exter-
nal motivation not materialized, it is doubtful whether the PBC would 
have accomplished as much as it has. 
The PBC’s components may be forced to adapt to the implica-
tions of potential changes, such as the consolidation of U.N. entities 
(following recommendation of the High-Level Panel on U.N. System-
Wide Coherence) or aspects of management reform.103  In the mean-
 102 Int’l Crisis Group, Sierra Leone, A New Era of Reform?, Africa Report No. 143,  
July 31, 2008. 
 103 High-Level Panel on U.N. System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Develop-
ment, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, Follow-Up to the Outcome of the 
Millennium Summit, U.N. Doc. A/61/583 (Nov. 20, 2006).  
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time, the mere possibility of these or other frequently discussed re-
forms taking place is sufficient to fuel a great deal of anticipatory pos-
turing on the part of U.N. agencies of all types.  To the extent that 
these actors see the PBC as a terrain upon which the struggle for in-
fluence can be played out, it has valid hopes for continued relevance. 
